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This paper examines the contribution of recently introduced village funds in rural Thailand, 
one  of  the  largest  microfinance  programs  ever  implemented.  We  use  a  cross-sectional 
approach examining village funds in relation to competing financial institutions. We find, first, 
that village funds reach the target groups of lower income households better than existing 
institutions  from  the  formal  sector.  Second,  village  funds  provide  loans  to  those  kinds  of 
borrowers which tend to be customers of informal financial institutions. Third, village funds 
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Village Funds in the Rural Credit Market of Thailand 
 
 
1  Introduction 
This  paper  analyzes  the  contribution  that  a  recently  introduced  large  microfinance 
institution,  i.e.  “village  funds”,  makes.  Microfinance  institutions  intend  to  improve  the 
provision of rural credit by bridging the segmentation into either formal or informal financial 
markets. In a sense they aim for combining advantages of formal and informal institutions by 
providing relatively cheap credit to poorer borrowers in ways that mirror informal institutions. 
We  test  the  realization  of  these  aims  in  an  empirical  study  of  so-called  “village  funds”, 
introduced in Thailand since 2001 as one of the largest government microfinance programs 
ever. We find that village funds indeed enlarge the spectrum of existing financial institutions 
in the desired direction as they improve “outreach” (Hermes and Lensink, 2007) and “access 
to finance” (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008). They reach poorer households than do formal 
institutions,  they  provide  financial  services  tentatively  substituting  informal  lending  with 
regards to lending policy and they contribute to easing credit constraints. 
The promotion of microfinance institutions during the last decades has often led to more 
variety of financial institutions in rural areas than before (Morduch, 1999). From an analytical 
point of view, researchers became interested in better understanding of various institutional 
arrangements in rural finance (e.g. Conning and Udry, 2007). From a policy point of view 
governments  and  non-governmental  organizations  introduced  microfinance  institutions  in 
order to overcome shortcomings of existing rural credit markets (Hermes and Lensink, 2007). 
Overall, we realize that the traditional segmentation into formal vs. informal institutions – 
exemplified  by  commercial  bank  vs.  money  lender  –  is  a  polar  view  which  may  hide  an 
interesting continuum of institutions operating in between. Thailand is a country where we 
indeed  observe  a  variety  of  financial  institutions  providing  rural  credit.  This  variety  was 
extended in an important move by the federal government’s decision to introduce one fund 
each to all about 77,000 villages in the years 2001/02. Thus, village funds have an obvious 
policy motivation as other microfinance institutions have as well: they are intended to expand 
financial infrastructure, here in particular credit, to households whose needs were not well 
served before. 
In order to analyze the contribution of village funds to rural credit markets, we rely on a 




Thailand. This area of Thailand is suited for our purpose as it is still characterized by large 
agricultural production and by income per capita below the country’s average so that rural 
credit is important. At the same time, there are various financial institutions operating in this 
area,  ranging  from  commercial  banks  to  moneylenders  but  also  including  others,  such  as 
village funds, which provides a broad spectrum. It is our objective to identify the position that 
village  funds  have  in  relation  to  these  other  financial  institutions.  This  identification  then 
allows inferences about the possible realization of policy goals. 
As  analytical  framework  to  position  village  funds  we  use  stylized  facts  about  the 
characteristics  of  formal  vs.  informal  finance.  Earlier  studies  compare  these  two  forms  of 
financial institutions in several countries and at various points in time, including Ghate (1992) 
on Asia, Mohieldin and Wright (2000) on Egypt, Pal (2002) on India and Barslund and Tarp 
(2008) on Vietnam.
1 Insights converge towards the following findings with respect to the kind 
of borrowers, their purpose of borrowing and credit contracts: 
•  Informal  borrowers  have  lower  income,  lower  assets,  tend  to  be  less  educated  and 
realized more often earlier default. 
•  Regarding  the  borrowing  purpose,  informal  credit  is  less  often  used  for  productive 
purposes  but  for  consumption.  It  is  a  consequence  that  it  is  also  relatively  more 
important as means to absorb shocks in general and health costs in particular. 
•  The informal credit contract seems to be of smaller volume, shorter-term duration and 
higher interest rate to be paid. 
It is thus interesting to learn that village funds play their intended role as microfinance 
institutions  in  the  sense  that  they  are  positioned  between  more  conventional  formal  and 
informal financial institutions. Descriptive statistics show that its borrowers have indeed an 
intermediate economic situation, such as an intermediate income level, which is rather lower 
than for formal financial institutions; moreover, the borrowing purpose includes productive as 
well as consumption purposes and, finally, credit terms are in between typical formal and 
informal terms. 
We complement this description by a multinomial logit regression, explaining the use of 
seven  groups  of  financial  institutions  by  borrowing  households,  namely  in  the  order  of 
increasing informality: (1) commercial banks or specialized state financial institutions, (2) the 
                                                            
1 Whereas we focus on household studies, other research about formal and informal finance focuses on 
firm’s financing, such as recently (and controversially) Allen et al. (2005) and Ayyagari et al. (2008). 
The relation between formal and informal finance can be more complex than being relevant here, for 
example, when informal lenders use loans from the formal sector and intermediate them to households 




Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, (3) village funds, (4) credit cooperatives, 
(5) policy funds, (6) moneylenders and (7) relatives or friends. The profiles of these groups are 
not so sharply distinguished from each other that differences would become mostly significant 
but all significant differences support the assumed continuum between formal and informal 
institutions. More interesting, village funds are positioned beyond formerly existing formal 
financial  institutions,  indicating  that  they  provide  services  towards  substituting  informal 
institutions. 
Finally,  we  analyze  whether  the  fact  of  individual  credit  constraint,  proxied  by  a 
questionnaire item asking directly for this experience, is reduced by a relatively larger volume 
of the village fund. This volume varies due to the fact that the fund has always one million 
Baht  independent  of  the  number  of  people  living  in  the  village  which  gives  a  per  capita 
variation by a factor of about three. We find that a larger amount of village fund per capita 
helps to overcome credit constraints. 
Our research is mainly linked to three strands of literature. First, we basically apply the 
methodology  of  studies  comparing  the  formal  and  the  informal  sector  but  we  extend  this 
dichotomy by  considering a richer spectrum of financial institutions. Second, our study is 
related  to  research  analyzing  the  working  of  microfinance  institutions  regarding  their 
outreach.
2  We  contribute  to  this  literature  by  considering  a  particular  case  being  also  of 
enormous economic importance relative to many other comparable cases. Third, we add to two 
earlier studies on Thailand’s village funds by Kaboski and Townsend (2004, 2007). Whereas 
these studies analyze the time dimension, i.e. the reaction of households to the introduction of 
village funds, we focus on the cross-section, i.e. the position of village funds relative to the 
other financial institutions. 
The paper is structured into four more sections. Section 2 informs about Thailand’s rural 
credit market, Section 3 introduces in the data underlying our research. Descriptive statistics 
about  village  funds  (in  relation  to  other  financial  institutions)  are  provided  in  Section  4, 
whereas regression approaches analyzing the contribution of village funds are discussed in 
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
                                                            
2 So we do not contribute to the large strand of microfinance literature which has been concerned with 
information asymmetries as for example discussed in Hoff and Stiglitz (1990)(see also Conning and 




2  Thailand’s rural credit market 
2.1  Rural credit market development 
The rural sector in Thailand is still an important part of the national economy. Even 
today, when Thailand belongs to the group of emerging markets with a middle-income level of 
its population, agriculture – which forms the main part of the rural economy – employs about 
38 percent of the labor force, generates about 23 percent of export value and earns about 10 
percent of GDP. Of course, the relative importance of agriculture was shrinking during the 
high growth development process of the last decades, so that the rural economy has been even 
more important in the past. Consequently, Thai governments have for a long time put effort 
into  the  development  of  the  rural  credit  markets  as  part  of  an  overall  rural  development 
strategy. 
Major changes in this respect took place in the mid 1970s. The government decided to 
tremendously increase credit supply in rural areas by two measures: first, commercial banks 
were ordered to extend a significant share of their total loans in the countryside, and, second, 
the 1966 established state-owned Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) 
expanded  its  loan  portfolio  by  about  20  percent  per  year.  This  expansion  has,  indeed, 
contributed to the finding of Siamwalla et al. (1990) in their 1984-85 conducted empirical 
study  that  “funds  are  not  the  scarce  factor”  (p.272)  in  Thailand’s  rural  credit  market. 
Moreover, due to this expansion the market share of lending by the informal sector roughly 
decreased from 90 percent to 50 percent within one decade (between mid 1970s to mid 1980s). 
Thus the credit market’s limitation is not general credit availability but availability to specific 
households and credit terms: Siamwalla et al. (1990, p.272) state that despite all successes by 
the  BAAC  there  is  still  need  of  “innovations  in  institution-building  to  compete  with  the 
information-solving devices in place in the informal sector”. 
Seen from this perspective one may ask whether the introduction of village funds since 
2001 was a right step into this direction, i.e. to shift the border between formal lending and 
informal lending at the cost of the latter. The BAAC was somewhat successful in this respect – 
do village funds provide the next step into the desired direction? 
 
2.2  Village funds 
The introduction of village funds since 2001 follows the logic of other microfinance 
programs that have been set up all over the world during the last decades. The initiative is 
intended to improve the supply side of rural credit markets by two channels: first, due to the 




foster growth and employment. Second, due to its construction as microfinance initiative these 
funds  may  be  better  targeted  to  reach  otherwise  disadvantaged  groups  in  the  rural  credit 
market, such as poorer households.
3 This research focuses on the second channel, the effect on 
target groups, whereas Kaboski and Townsend (2004) focus more on the first channel. They 
find, indeed, that the introduction of village funds has stimulated the overall level of credit, in 
particular short-term credit and has also stimulated economic activity, such as investment, 
expenditure and consumption. Moreover, village funds seem to have structural effects, in that 
certain credit purposes have relatively gained (e.g. agricultural investment and consumption) 
and in that some lenders may have been affected (e.g. commercial banks rather gained and 
informal lending rather lost, at least in the very beginning). 
Village  funds  are  set  up  in  the  following  way  (more  details  e.g.  in  Kaboski  and 
Townsend, 2004). They address the smallest political unit, that is the about 77,000 villages in 
Thailand which typically have a few hundred households, sometimes even below one hundred. 
At each village the fund has to be formally established, has to set its own regulations (within a 
given  framework)  and  these  regulations  have  to  be  accepted  by  the  National  Village  and 
Urban  Community  Fund  Office.  Part  of  the  requirements  is  that  the  villagers  form  a 
committee,  consisting  of  about  ten  persons,  which  decides  on  the  lending  policies  and 
determines who may borrow. In this sense village funds operate more similar to a formal 
institution. However, village funds do neither have a permanent office nor its own staff, so that 
they are regarded as being in between formal and informal institutions. 
The volume of each village fund is one million Baht, i.e. roughly about 28 thousand US 
Dollars, depending on the prevailing exchange rate. The typical loan amount extended should 
be below 20,000 Baht and must not be above 50,000 Baht. Loans are secured by guarantors 
among the village fund members so that the VF’s incentives are similar to many other joint 
liability revolving funds. Loan duration is at maximum 12 months and the interest rate has to 
be positive. In the sample studied by Kaboski and Townsend (2004), the village fund group 




                                                            
3 The village funds objectives are officially stated in the “Act of National Village and Urban 
Community Fund” (B.E.2547) as follows: 1. to be used as a revolving fund for investments in 
occupational development, job creation, income generating activities and welfare improvement; 2. to 
be used as emergency fund to cope with urgent problems; 3. to empower the grassroots and stimulate 
the rural economies. As political motivation, the government had repeatedly claimed that this program 




3  Data 
Our data are drawn from a household survey in Thailand collected by the Vulnerability 
in Southeast Asia Project. The survey was conducted in April to June 2007 and covers 2,186 
households from three provinces in the Northeastern region. The three provinces are namely 
Buriram, Nakhon Phanom and Ubon Ratchatani. 
We  apply  a  three  stage  random  sampling  procedure  where  provinces  are  constituted 
strata and the primary sampling units (PSU) are sub-districts (Tambon). The first stage of the 
sampling  procedure  involves  choosing  sub-districts,  which  are  selected  with  probability 
proportional to size by a systematic sample from a list ordered by population density, which 
ensures proportional coverage of densely (peri-urban) and less densely populated areas. The 
measure of size is the number of households as of 2005 according to the NRC2d Database 
(Department of Community Development, Ministry of Interior). The second stage involves 
choosing two villages which are sampled from each selected sub-districts with probability 
proportional to size. Finally, within each village, 10 households are randomly selected. All 
together, 2,186 households from 220 villages were interviewed. This data provides a quite 
representative sample of rural households in Northeastern Thailand. 
The survey includes information on the characteristics of households, the purpose of 
borrowing  and  characteristics  of  loan  contracts.  We  will  introduce  specific  data  more 
comprehensively when we use them later in this research. 
 
 
4  The position of village funds as a lending institution 
In this section we provide information about the lending of village funds in relation to 
six further sources which are important in Thailand’s rural credit market. For each of these 
seven  lending  institutions  we  give  aggregated  information  on  activity  and  relative  market 
importance  (Section  4.1).  We  also  describe  characteristics  of  borrowing  households, 
borrowing purposes as stated by households and characteristics of loan contracts (Section 4.2). 
 
4.1  Aggregate statistics about village funds and other lending institutions 
The seven main lending institutions in our sample are the following, presented in order 
of increasing informality: conventional formal financial institutions are commercial banks as 
well as a few special financial institutions, such as the state-owned Government Savings Bank. 
Due to their similar behavior and the few observations available we put them in one group and 




is the above introduced Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). The 
third institution, the village funds (VF), is our main interest of research. Then there are, fourth, 
the semi-formal savings and credit groups (CREDIT).
4 Fifth, the government offers policy 
loans with a narrow focus and at subsidized lending conditions, mainly the “student loan fund” 
and the “poverty eradication scheme” (POLICY)
5. A sixth lending institution is various kinds 
of  moneylenders  (ML)  and  finally,  relatives  and  friends  (RELA)  form  another  source  of 
borrowing for rural households.
6 
Table 1 informs about the relative importance of these institutions in our sample with 
regards  to  three  dimensions:  the  number  of  loans  outstanding,  the  number  of  borrowing 
households and the loan volume outstanding. The first three lines present data for the total 
sample, the last three lines present data for loans received in 2006-2007, i.e. the same period 
for which we have matching household data. The pattern for the total sample and the one year 
period are very similar because most loans have a short-term maturity of one year or even less. 
Already the first look at this table demonstrates the widespread use of household borrowing 
and the enormous variety of lending institutions in rural Thailand. More than 82 percent of all 
households have a loan outstanding (1,806 of 2,186). Moreover, the various institutions are all 
quite important, as each of them serves more than 10 percent of the households; the only 
exception is CB. As a consequence there are multiple lending sources for many households. 
Regarding the position of VF, it is the most important source of household loans in terms of 
the number of loans and borrowers and it ranks second in terms of the volume of credit behind 
the BAAC (due to BAAC’s larger loan sizes). 
So, VF is successful with respect to outreach as it serves about two thirds of borrowing 
households and represents a 15 percent market share in outstanding volume. 
 
                                                            
4 This category includes a variety of institutions such as community based savings and credit groups, 
community rice banks, and cooperative stores. These institutions are analyzed in more detail in 
Kaboski and Townsend (2005). 
5 The student loan fund and the poverty eradication scheme are treated as separate choice as these 
programs are quite distinct from other institutions in terms of the target groups, the usage of the loan, 
and the interest rate charged. The two programs provide 0-1% interest rate loans to households under 
the poverty line (approximately 62,000 Baht/household/year or USD 1,800/household/year). The 
student loan fund provides loans for education only while the poverty eradication scheme gives loans 
for production purpose. They are managed by government offices which also assess eligibility, approve 
and monitor the loan. 
6 We have not considered hire-purchase loans which are often used when buying a car (or related kind 
of loans) because they are different from regular business of lending institutions. In particular, in our 




4.2  Detailed information about borrower and loan characteristics 
Descriptive statistics about the loans received in 2006-2007 from these seven institutions 
from our sample are presented in Table 2 in order to describe the rural credit market and in 
particular the position of village funds in this market. Panel A of this table gives borrowers’ 
characteristics of those households who borrow from the seven sources and the last column of 
the table reports the characteristics of the average borrowing household. So, one household 
will be counted at each institution where it is borrowing (and in case of two loans from one 
source it is counted just once). We also delete 10 extreme outlier observations (loan items) for 
loan size and interest rate. The resulting sample has 3,298 loans for 1,582 households.
7 
Obviously, a simplified distinction between formal institutions (CB) and moneylenders 
(ML) would provide an extremely selective picture of the true borrowing situation as only 
about 249 of the relevant 1,588 households are covered, i.e. just 15 percent. By contrast, VF 
are  the  single  most  important  lender  to  households  when  considering  cases  as  they  serve 
1,076, i.e. almost 68 percent of borrowing households. Characteristics of borrowers across the 
seven lending institutions are clearly different, in particular in the case of CB. Their borrowers 
earn much higher income, possess more assets, are more employed in the formal sector and 
take higher loan volumes. By contrast, VFs seem to be used by more “median” borrowers 
which  gives  the  VF  an  intermediate  position  between  formal  (CB,  BAAC)  and  informal 
institutions (CREDIT, POLICY, ML, RELA). This intermediate position applies – in the order 
of Table 2 – to female headed households, number of children, share of informal workers, 
income, assets, area of owned land and refusion of a loan. Thus, compared to formal financial 
institutions,  VF  reach  households  with  a  somewhat  lower  socioeconomic  status,  in  short 
“lower income households”. 
Turning to Panel B, i.e. the purpose of borrowing, a clear pattern emerges: The BAAC 
and also VF lend relatively more for agricultural production, CB lends very often for non-
agricultural  production  and  the  more  informal  lending  institutions  lend  for  consumption 
purposes. 
Finally, Panel C informs about characteristics of loan contracts. The VF has an interest 
rate below average. As Thailand’s inflation rate in the years 2006 and 2007 is close to 5 
percent p.a., the real interest rate of VF loans is just slightly positive. The BAAC is also still 
relatively “cheap” but more expensive than VF. Interestingly, the formal and the informal 
                                                            
7 Extreme outlier observations are defined in this study as observations more than 8 standard 
deviations from the median. This definition is also used, for example, in Biddle et al. (1997) and Trà 
and Lensink (2008). We use 8 standard deviations from the median in order to declare an outlier with a 




extremes, i.e. CB and ML, charge comparatively high interest rates. Another distinguishing 
feature of VF is that they do not require land as collateral but guarantors. Finally, VF do not 
seem to be used for shock related borrowing, probably because loan processing takes too long. 
Overall, the descriptive statistics provide a first impression about the VF. It is very wide-
spread, borrowing households are tentatively less well-off compared to borrowers from the 
BAAC, VF is used for productive and consumption purposes, its loan size is rather small, has 
low  interest  rates  and  has  relatively  favorable  collateral  requirements.  In  short,  the  VF 
obviously  plays  an  important  role  which  is  –  seen  from  the  BAAC  –  closer  to  informal 




5  Analyzing the contribution of village funds 
This section shows that village funds (VF) do indeed provide financial services different 
from  earlier  existing  institutions.  First,  we  analyze  the  factors  underlying  the  decision  by 
borrowing  households  to  utilize  credit  from  the  seven  distinguished  lending  institutions 
(Section 5.1). Second, we assess the aimed impact of the VF which is to mitigate the credit 
constraints of rural households (Section 5.2). 
 
5.1  Choice of lending institutions by borrowing households 
In this section we analyze how households sort themselves among different lenders and 
what factors affect households’ decisions of which lending institution to borrow from. We 
apply the multinomial logit model to study the household’s choice of lender. We treat each 
loan as a separate borrowing decision as is common in the literature, such as for example 
Siamwalla  et  al.  (1990).  Thus  multiple  loans  contracted  by  one  household  are  treated  as 
separate transactions, so that the analysis is performed at the loan level. 
A borrowing household chooses between the seven lending institutions. Assuming that 
the error terms of the utility functions are i.i.d. and extreme value distributed, the probability 
that household i chooses to borrow loan j from lender k, Prob(yij=k) is given by: 
 
Prob(yij = k)  = exp(αkXi +βkZj +γkDp)/Σm=1,...,7(αmXi +βmZj +γmDp)      (1) 
 
where yij is a categorical dependent variable representing borrower’s choice of lender. Xi is a 




economic performance may differ by region, dummy variables for each province, Dp, are also 
included in the regression. 
It is important to note that the use of credit source by a particular borrower is determined 
by both the decision of lender as well as the choice of borrower. The data used in this analysis 
are observed equilibrium outcomes in the credit markets, and thus cannot be used to separately 
identify  the  demand  and  supply  factors.  Our  estimates  should  be  seen  as  reduced-form 
equations for the use of credit from the seven different sources. 
For  our  analysis,  we  use  only  loans  that  were  granted  in  2006-2007  as  we  have 
information  on  household  characteristics  in  this  period.  We  use  the  following  household 
characteristics: the age of the household head, gender of the household head, number of adults, 
number of children (below 18 years old), occupation of the household head, years of education 
of the household head, household income, household asset holdings, total area of owned land 
and  household  credit  history.  We  classify  household  occupations  into  four  groups:  farm 
households,  wage  earners  in  the  informal  sector,  wage  earners  in  the  formal  sector  and 
business owners. As a measure of household’s credit history, we use the value of defaulted 
loans  and  loans  that  are  repaid  late  divided  by  the  total  loan  outstanding.  The  loan 
characteristics include borrowing purpose and whether a loan is taken to cope with shock. 
Borrowing purposes are classified into three broad categories: agricultural production, non-
agricultural production and consumption. After missing observations on various household 
characteristics are dropped, the sample consists of 3,246 loan items. 
We explain households’ choice of lending institutions by way of a multinomial logit 
model. The VF is taken as benchmark so that coefficients for the six other lending institutions 
indicate  (significant)  differences  in  relation  to  VF.  Results  are  shown  in  Table  3.  In  the 
following we discuss statistically significant coefficients which seem to give a pattern mainly 
confirming the finding from Section 3, i.e. an intermediate role for VF. 
Our regression displays an interesting result with respect to household socioeconomic 
status.  With  the  exception  of  CB  and  BAAC,  households  borrowing  from  VF  and  other 
informal lenders are similar in terms of occupation, education, income, assets and landholding. 
CB appear to serve wealthier households, those working in the formal sector, having higher 
income and less dependents. BAAC services households with more assets but lends less to 
informal workers, landless households and small landholders. VF and other informal lenders 
are more common to those with lower socioeconomic status. We also find that, among the 
informal lenders, households borrowing from RELA have lower income and more dependents. 




It is worth noting that, despite BAAC’s adoption of joint liability as principal form of 
security for loans, small landholders are less likely to obtain credit from BAAC than from VF. 
It could be that land is picking up some of the occupation effect as most BAAC customers are 
farm  households.  However,  our  regression  already  controls  for  occupation,  thus  the  land 
coefficient reflects the effect of land that is not due to occupation. Another hypothesis is that 
VF accepts a less restricted collateral compared with BAAC. This is also shown in Table 2; 96 
percent of loans from VF are issued with guarantors as collateral. Furthermore, according to 
BAAC  rules,  loans  beyond  100,000  baht  must  be  secured  by  tangible  collateral,  usually 
through mortgage of land and buildings. Therefore landless households are not able to pledge 
land as collateral and thus fail to obtain loans from BAAC. VF tentatively fills this gap as land 
is not important in obtaining a loan from VF. 
Regarding credit history, it appears that village funds are more willing to provide credit 
to households with bad credit history. The estimates show that households with bad credit 
history, measured by the value of defaulted loans as ratio of total loan outstanding, have higher 
probability of getting a loan from VF than from BAAC or CRED. This is probably due to 
restrictions on the supply side as BAAC and CRED may ration households with bad credit 
history.
8 As a result, those households have to direct their demand towards VF and the more 
informal lenders. 
Regarding the use of credit, the formal and informal lenders appear to serve different 
credit demands. There is also an indication that VF plays an intermediate role in bridging this 
gap. Production loans are primarily served by the formal lenders: CB lend very often for non-
agricultural  production  purposes  while  BAAC  services  loans  for  agricultural  production 
purposes.  Informal  lenders  such  as  CRED,  ML  and  RELA  tend  to  provide  loans  for 
consumption  needs.  Loans  from  VF  are  channelled  to  both  production  and  consumption 
purposes. 
Contrary to our expection of the role of VF as shock absorbing institution, we find that 
loans that are taken to cope with shocks have a higher probability of coming from ML and 
RELA than from VF. This is consistent with Fafchamps and Lund (2003) who find this role 
for relatives in the Philippines too. The prominence of informal institutions for shock-related 
borrowing is probably due to the relative speed of acquiring credit from ML and RELA as 
other lenders usually require a few weeks or even months to process the loan application. 
                                                            
8 According to BAAC, the consequences of defaulting on a loan or making late repayment are not 




So, there are interesting differences in borrowing households across the seven lending 
institutions. Seen from the VF, and in a very rough classification, the VF stands between more 
formal institutions, i.e. CB and BAAC, on the one side and the most informal institutions, i.e. 
ML and RELA, on the other side. Thus, the VF is in this sense an intermediate institution 
servicing different borrowers than formal financial institutions did before. In this sense, the VF 
tentatively substitutes informal institutions to some extent. 
 
5.2  The relation between village funds and credit constraint 
In this section we examine whether the village fund (VF) helps to reduce households’ 
credit constraints. Such analysis also provides an evaluation of the program as a core objective 
of VF is to reduce poverty by mitigating the credit constraints of rural households. 
To illustrate the correlation between credit constraint and VF credit, Figure 1 plots the 
proportion of credit constrained households within village against the average amount of VF 
credit received by a household in a given village. An observation is a village. The proportion 
of credit constrained households in a given village is measured by the number of households 
being credit constrained divided by the number of households applying for credit. Also shown 
in the figure is the fitted value for the proportion of constrained households. The fitted value is 
obtained from a linear regression of this variable on the average amount of VF credit only. The 
value of the proportion of credit constrained households ranges from 0 to 1. A value equal to 0 
indicates no constrained households in a village while a value equal to 1 indicated that all 
households within a village are credit constrained. As is evident from Figure 1, the proportion 
of  credit  constrained  households  is  inversely  correlated  with  the  amount  of  VF  credit  to 
household. Yet caution is needed before drawing any conclusion about the causal relation 
between village funds and credit constraint. 
Three main issues arise in estimating the impacts of VF credit on households’ credit 
constraints. The first issue is to conceptually define credit constraints (see Petrick, 2005). We 
use a broader definition of credit constraints. In this paper, households are classified as credit 
constrained  if  they  receive  less  credit  amount  than  they  demand.  In  our  questionnaire, 
households are asked to report whether they ever applied for a loan and whether their loan 
application was completely rejected or whether they obtained some amount but less than they 
applied  for.  Thus  according  to  our  definition,  households  whose  loan  applications  are 
completely rejected are credit constrained as well as those households who are given some 
credit  but  less  than  the  amount  they  ask  for.  According  to  our  data,  209  out  of  2,186 




The second challenge is that we need an exogenous variation in the fund size in order to 
make comparisons in the cross-section of households. An OLS estimate of the effect of VF 
credit on credit constraint may suffer from the potential endogeneity of VF credit as there may 
be some unobserved factors that determine both the amount of VF credit obtained and the 
probability of being credit constrained. To address this problem, we use the IV method to 
control for the endogeneity associated with the amount of VF credit. The instruments are, first, 
the  inverse  number  of  households  in  the  village.  Under  this  program,  one  million  baht  is 
injected  into  each  village  regardless  of  the  village  population.  Thus  the  probability  that  a 
household in a given village receives the village fund credit is inversely correlated with the 
number of village households. The second instrument is the interest rate on VF credit. Under 
this  program,  individual  VF  committees  have  some  discretion  in  setting  interest  rates, 
maximum loan amounts, and terms of loans. This provides an exogenous variation in VF 
interest rates across villages, which implies variation in VF impact. 
The third issue is that there is a potential selection bias as we observe the occurrence of 
credit rationing only for those households who apply for credit. To address this problem, we 
employ a Heckman two-step selection model, where the selection into the sample of those who 
apply  for  credit  is  first  modeled,  and  the  inverse  Mills  ratio  from  this  regression  is 
incorporated into the credit constraint equation (see Kochar, 1997). 
To estimate the impact of VF controlling for both endogeneity and selection bias, we 
split our estimation in two steps. The first step is to estimate the selection equation. From the 
first step, we can compute the inverse Mills ratio and include it in the second step. In the 
second step, we estimate the probability of credit constraint by IV method with the number of 
village households and VF interest rate as instruments for VF credit.  
The selection equation which estimates the probability of applying for credit takes the 
form: 
 
Prob(applyi = 1) = exp(δX1i +φDp)[1+exp(δX1i +φDp)]      (2) 
 
where i indexes households. The variable applyi is an indicator of whether a household applies 
for a loan. X1i is a vector of household characteristics that are expected to affect household 
credit demand. These household characteristics include the age of the household head, gender 
of the household head, number of adults, number of children (below 18 years old), household 




of landholdings and a measure of household credit history. Finally Dp represents province 
dummies. The analysis is performed at the household level. 
The second stage regression which estimates the probability that a household is credit 
constrained takes the following form: 
 
Prob(rationi = 1) = exp(α1X2i +β1wi+γ1Dp)[1+exp(α1X2i +β1wi+γ1Dp)]  if applyi =1  (3) 
          wi = α2X2i +β2Zi+γ2Dpi+εi              (4) 
 
where rationi is a binary variable taking a value of one if a household is fully or partially credit 
rationed.
9  X2i  is  a  vector  of  household  characteristics  that  are  expected  to  affect  credit 
rationing. We specify the same set of household characteristics for both selection and credit 
constraint equations. The variable wi is the amount of VF credit to household which is a 
potential endogenous variable. Zi is a vector of VF instruments, namely the inverse number of 
village households and the VF interest rate. The variable Dp represents province dummies. 
The estimation results are presented in Table 4. Panel A of the table shows the results for 
the selection equation. Panel B presents the results from the first stage regression where the 
endogenous variable – the amount of VF credit – is regressed on all exogenous variables 
including the instruments. Panel C shows the results from the second stage regression where 
the probability of credit constraint is estimated. 
Results  from  the  first  stage  regression  show  that  our  instruments  are  significant 
predictors  of  the  endogenous  credit  variable.  The  number  of  village  households  and  the 
interest rate are strongly correlated with the amount of VF credit.  
In  the  second  stage  regression,  the  most  interesting  result  is  that,  at  the  10  percent 
significance level, VF credit reduces the probability of being credit constrained. This result 
suggests cautiously that the program is successful in achieving its goal (see also Zeller, 1994). 
Other household characteristics are not important predictors of the probability of being 
credit constrained. However some of these variables show to be significant in the selection 
equation. Panel A shows that richer households are less likely to apply for credit. This finding 
implies that low income households may self-select to apply for credit while high income 
households  choose  not  to.  We  also  find  that  younger  households,  households  with  more 
                                                            
9 Credit rationing can be full or partial. Full credit rationing occurs when the loan application is 
completely rejected by the lender. Partial credit rationing occurs when the borrower receives credit less 










6  Conclusions 
This study examines whether the introduction of village funds in rural Thailand – one of 
the  largest  microfinance  programs  ever  implemented  –  has  realized  its  ambitions.  We 
contribute to this discussion by providing a novel cross-sectional approach complementing 
earlier time-series studies (Kaboski and Townsend, 2004, 2007). The role of village funds is 
assessed in relation to competing financial institutions: which role do village funds play and, 
in  particular,  do  they  provide  desired  services  “better”  than  existing  formal  financial 
institutions? We find, indeed, that village funds seem to function as intended by its founders. 
In  detail,  our  empirical  tests  yield  three  results:  first,  village  funds  reach  the  target 
groups of households with a lower socioeconomic status to a higher degree than competing 
institutions  from  the  formal  sector.  Second,  village  funds  provide  loans  to  those  kinds  of 
borrowers which are more typical customers of informal than formal financial institutions. 
Third, village funds help to reduce credit constraints. Overall, these results indicate a positive 
role of village funds, a finding which is tentatively in line with Kaboski and Townsend (2007) 
who state that village funds provide a kind of social protection. 
So, Thailand’s experience with the microfinance institution of village funds may provide 
some  stimulus  for  other  countries  to  think  about  following  this  institutional  innovation. 
However, there are two caveats to our study which are important from a policy perspective: 
(1) we do not and cannot analyze whether the introduction of village funds in Thailand was an 
efficient instrument in the sense that the cost-benefit-ratio is superior to alternatives. Concerns 
may be nurtured by three facts: VF is an “intermediate” institution and thus an imperfect 
substitute  for  informal  institutions,  second,  VF  does  not  seem  to  be  effective  as  shock-
absorber, and, third, VF has a limited role for investment financing due to its restricted amount 
of single loans and restricted duration. (2) Due to the allocation mechanism in villages, one 
has to face the possibility that there may be discrimination against minor interest groups or 
generally less powerful persons and groups in the villages. These gaps in existing evidence 
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 Table 1: Number of Loans, Number of Borrowing Households and Volume of Credit by Lending Institution 
 
   CB  BAAC  VF  CREDIT  POLICY  ML  RELA  Total 
Total Sample                 
Number of outstanding loan contracts  134  1,288  1,629  347  275  368  301  4,342 
Number of borrowing households 
a  112  949  1,153  254  235  301  245  1,806 
Volume of credit (mil Baht)  22.8  75.3  27.1  26.7  4.8  19.1  9.5  187 
                 
Loans received in 2006-2007                 
Number of outstanding loan contracts  64  927  1,427  272  165  228  225  3,308 
Number of borrowing households 
b  57  696  1,076  205  147  194  192  1,588 
Volume of credit (mil Baht)  9.9  45.5  23.3  14.8  1.8  9.3  6.6  111 
There are 4,342 loans outstanding in May06-April07. Out of these, 3,308 loans (76.2%) were received in 2006-07. 
Note: 
a) Summing the number of borrowing household over the seven institutions is not equal to 1,806 as some households are customers of more than one 
lending institutions.  
b) Summing the number of borrowing household over the seven institutions is not equal to 1,588 as some households are customers of more than 
one lending institutions. Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Borrower and Loan Characteristics by Lending Institution 
  CB  BAAC  VF  CREDIT  POLICY  ML  RELA  Overall 
Panel A: Characteristics of Borrower               
Age of household head  50.5  55.3  53.2  53.6  51.4  53.6  50.5  53.6 
Proportion female headed household (%)  22.8%  20.7%  25.8%  28.8%  26.5%  29.4%  25.5%  25.4% 
Number of adults  2.8  2.8  2.7  2.6  2.5  2.7  2.6  2.7 
Number of children  1.2  1.3  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.7  1.6  1.4 
Household occupation (%)                 
farmer  38.6%  77.2%  69.7%  62.4%  71.4%  65.5%  68.8%  68.9% 
informal worker  8.8%  7.3%  12.3%  13.7%  10.2%  18.0%  18.8%  12.7% 
formal worker  31.6%  6.9%  7.8%  14.1%  12.2%  8.2%  5.7%  9.1% 
business owner  21.1%  8.6%  10.2%  9.8%  6.1%  8.2%  6.8%  9.3% 
Years of education  6.8  4.7  4.8  5.4  5.0  4.6  4.9  4.8 
Income   231,490  114,776  112,564  140,679  102,061  109,182  91,906  116,914 
Assets   545,601  305,493  247,380  271,932  215,561  281,504  218,435  259,527 
Area of owned land  3.4  3.9  3.1  2.7  2.7  2.9  3.0  3.2 
Value of loans defaulted or repaid late to 
total loan outstanding (%)  6.6%  4.3%  8.5%  5.2%  6.0%  8.6%  10.7%  7.5% 
Ever refused a loan? (%)  10.5%  9.8%  11.8%  12.2%  12.2%  19.1%  20.8%  11.1% 
Amount of credit per borrowing household   173,456  65,425  21,678  72,203  12,148  48,184  34,339  70,018 
Panel B: Purpose of Borrowing               
agricultural production  21.1%  51.8%  44.9%  30.0%  39.4%  24.3%  24.4%  42.1% 
non-agricultural production  40.4%  17.0%  15.6%  12.1%  10.3%  15.3%  18.9%  16.3% 
consumption  36.8%  29.7%  38.5%  57.2%  49.7%  59.0%  56.2%  40.6% 
Panel C: Characteristics of Loan Contract             
Loan size  104,705  49,122  16,346  36,548  10,823  41,135  29,303  31,136 
Loan duration  3.8  2.0  1.0  1.4  2.2  1.3  1.2  1.5 
Average interest rate (%)  22.9%  9.9%  6.3%  11.0%  3.1%  55.0%  10.6%  11.5% 
Weighted average interest rate (%)  21.4%  9.9%  6.1%  11.2%  3.9%  48.2%  9.0%  13.2% 
Proportion of loans with 0% interest rate (%)  0.0%  1.2%  0.4%  9.0%  53.3%  2.6%  67.6%  8.7% 
Collateral requirement (%)                 
land  27.9%  36.0%  0.4%  0.0%  0.6%  27.7%  5.8%  13.1% 
other assets  6.6%  1.0%  1.0%  5.3%  0.6%  9.4%  1.3%  2.0% 
guarantor  54.1%  60.8%  96.4%  75.9%  84.1%  13.8%  3.6%  71.4% 
none  11.5%  2.3%  2.2%  18.8%  14.6%  49.1%  89.2%  13.5% 
Shock related Borrowing? (%)  9.8%  6.4%  6.5%  9.0%  6.7%  14.1%  23.6%  8.40% 
 Table 3: Multinomial Logit Model Predicting the Choice of Lender by Borrowing Household 
  CB  BAAC  CREDIT  POLICY  ML  RELA 
Household characteristics 
Age of household head  -0.0139  0.0136**  0.0031  -0.0092  -0.0064  -0.0178** 
  (-0.91)  (3.45)  (0.51)  (-1.17)  (-0.95)  (-2.28) 
Female headed household  -0.0600  -0.2463**  0.1754  0.1118  0.1715  0.0979 
  (-0.17)  (-2.26)  (1.10)  (0.57)  (0.96)  (0.54) 
Number of adults  0.1003  -0.0686  0.0263  -0.0971  0.0695  -0.0198 
  (0.79)  (-1.62)  (0.41)  (-1.17)  (1.07)  (-0.28) 
Number of children  -0.3295**  -0.0268  -0.0072  -0.0744  0.2351**  0.1733** 
  (-2.15)  (-0.63)  (-0.11)  (-0.82)  (3.63)  (2.50) 
Farm household  -0.8051*  0.1732  -0.0391  0.4456  -0.0083  0.1478 
  (-1.93)  (1.01)  (-0.16)  (1.10)  (-0.03)  (0.47) 
Informal worker  -0.5000  -0.3810*  -0.0600  0.0736  0.5337  0.5439 
  (-0.90)  (-1.67)  (-0.20)  (0.16)  (1.59)  (1.52) 
Formal worker  1.1073**  0.1605  0.1829  0.7056  0.4298  -0.1252 
  (2.60)  (0.69)  (0.59)  (1.53)  (1.04)  (-0.29) 
Years of education  0.0663  0.0089  0.0429  0.0171  -0.0465  0.0001 
  (1.39)  (0.45)  (1.51)  (0.50)  (-1.28)  (0.00) 
Income (10,000 Baht)  0.0089*  -0.0028  0.0063  -0.0041  -0.0033  -0.0124* 
  (1.91)  (-0.90)  (1.46)  (-0.53)  (-0.54)  (-1.79) 
Assets (10,000 Baht)  0.0018  0.0025**  -0.0005  -0.0002  0.0022  -0.0054 
  (0.65)  (2.01)  (-0.30)  (-0.08)  (1.12)  (-1.46) 
Area of landholding  0.0152  0.0456**  -0.0786**  -0.0508  0.0233  0.0329 
  (0.26)  (2.97)  (-2.29)  (-1.46)  (0.91)  (1.37) 
Ratio of defaulted loans to 
total loan outstanding  -0.0301  -0.8688**  -0.7138**  -0.5704  -0.0010  0.1759 
  (-0.04)  (-3.24)  (-2.00)  (-1.23)  (-0.00)  (0.51) 
Loan characteristics 
Agricultural production 
loan  -1.2720**  -0.0591  -0.0643  0.1589  -0.5588**  -0.8528** 
  (-3.27)  (-0.47)  (-0.29)  (0.55)  (-2.40)  (-3.71) 
Consumption loan  -0.7250**  -0.4203**  0.6117**  0.6107**  0.3874*  0.0189 
  (-2.36)  (-3.20)  (2.88)  (2.17)  (1.85)  (0.09) 
Shock related borrowing  0.4293  0.1412  0.1377  0.0032  0.8285**  1.4390** 
  (0.87)  (0.80)  (0.56)  (0.01)  (3.64)  (7.01) 
Province dummies 
Buriram  0.1061  0.4056**  -0.4886**  0.0009  0.6816**  -0.0188 
  (0.25)  (2.70)  (-2.41)  (0.00)  (3.06)  (-0.08) 
Ubon  -0.2424  0.2562*  -0.4359**  -0.1629  -0.6939**  -0.1719 
  (-0.60)  (1.75)  (-2.29)  (-0.65)  (-2.83)  (-0.78) 
Constant   -1.8111*  -1.3076**  -1.8262**  -1.8311**  -2.2180**  -1.0525* 
  (-1.94)  (-3.90)  (-3.74)  (-2.90)  (-3.97)  (-1.67) 
Pseudo R2  0.059           
N  3246           
VF is the reference category.  
t-statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05 




Table 4: Impact of Village Fund Credit on Probability of Credit Constraint 
Panel A: Selection Equation  Coef.  Std. Err.  t-stat 
Household characteristics       
Age of household head  -0.015**  0.003  -4.85 
Female headed household  0.021  0.073  0.29 
Number of adults  0.031  0.034  0.91 
Number of children  0.073**  0.033  2.21 
Farm household  0.011  0.147  0.07 
Informal worker  -0.312*  0.167  -1.87 
Formal worker  0.036  0.188  0.19 
Years of education  0.022  0.015  1.41 
Income (10,000 Baht)  0.000**  0.000  -2.29 
Assets (10,000 Baht)  0.000  0.000  1.16 
Area of landholding  0.019  0.017  1.1 
Ratio of defaulted loans to total loan outstanding  1.692**  0.413  4.1 
Province dummy, Buriram  0.172*  0.096  1.8 
Province dummy, Ubon  0.199**  0.088  2.26 
Constant   1.299**  0.241  5.38 
Number of observation  2141     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05 




Table 4: Impact of Village Fund Credit on Probability of Credit Constraint (Continued) 
Panel B: Regress Village Fund Credit on Instruments  Coef.  Std. Err.  t-stat 
Household characteristics       
Age of household head  -33.933  59.512  -0.57 
Female headed household  1101.176  1163.924  0.95 
Number of adults  1167.814**  375.110  3.11 
Number of children  -646.973  470.191  -1.38 
Farm household  176.780  1721.256  0.1 
Informal worker  -17.917  2314.953  -0.01 
Formal worker  -2630.567  1760.243  -1.49 
Years of education  59.048  179.577  0.33 
Income (10,000 Baht)  -0.001  0.003  -0.24 
Assets (10,000 Baht)  0.001  0.002  0.42 
Area of landholding  -58.715  169.837  -0.35 
Ratio of defaulted loans to total loan outstanding  -7814.586*  4601.395  -1.7 
Province dummy, Buriram  1630.373  2698.316  0.6 
Province dummy, Ubon  -878.295  2504.547  -0.35 
Inverse Mills ratio  -15045.680  10726.810  -1.4 
Constant   30977.78**  5172.563  5.99 
Instruments        
Number of village households  -63.914**  26.574  -2.41 
Interest rate on VF credit  -801.030**  373.550  -2.14 
Panel C: Regress Probability of Credit Constraint on  
Predicted Village Fund Credit 
Coef.  Std. Err.  t-stat 
Village fund credit ( predicted)  -1.24E-05*  6.48E-06  -1.92 
Age of household head  0.000  0.007  0 
Female headed household  0.034  0.094  0.36 
Number of adults  0.037  0.039  0.96 
Number of children  -0.020  0.042  -0.48 
Farm household  -0.139  0.140  -0.99 
Informal worker  0.238  0.208  1.14 
Formal worker  -0.234  0.195  -1.2 
Years of education  -0.021  0.019  -1.11 
Income (10,000 Baht)  0.000  0.000  -0.41 
Assets (10,000 Baht)  0.000  0.000  -0.5 
Area of landholding  -0.022  0.015  -1.53 
Ratio of defaulted loans to total loan outstanding  -0.049  0.436  -0.11 
Province dummy, Buriram  -0.381**  0.119  -3.21 
Province dummy, Ubon  -0.122  0.119  -1.02 
Inverse Mills ratio  -1.451  1.085  -1.34 
Constant   -0.221  0.345  -0.64 
Number of observation  1767     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05 











Note: An observation is a village, so there are 220 observations. The value of the proportion of credit 
constrained households must be in [0, 1]. However, there is no value between 0 and 0.1 in our sample 
because a maximum of ten households is interviewed per village. Thus the minimum positive value of 
this variable is 0.1 which correspond to the case where, out of ten households, only one household 
reported being credit constrained. However, there may be also one out of nine or eight households being 











0  20000  40000  60000 
Average village fund credit (in Baht) 
Fitted values  Proportion of constrained households 